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Abstract 
The main purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship among the type of agency costs and 
corporate governance with liquidity in recognized companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange in 2014. The 
statistical population studied in this research includes enterprises recognized in the Tehran Stock Exchange and 
the systematic elimination method has been used to select the sample which 166 enterprises have been selected. 
The information of research has been obtained through the collection of data from different companies by 
referring to financial reports and statements, explanatory notes, weekly and monthly reports of the stock 
exchange, websites, databases, journals and reports of bourse and finally the questionnaire is used to receive the 
views of managers and employees. 
To describe as well as analyze and examine the data, the descriptive and inferential statistics methods 
respectively have been used which the SPSS software has been assisted for this purpose. The results obtained 
from this study showed that agency costs and corporate governance have the inverse and relationship with 
liquidity, respectively.  
Finally, considering the support of hypotheses and results obtained in research, proposals have been prepared 
and presented. 
Keywords: Agency costs, the corporate governance, liquidity.  
 
1. Introduction 
The complicated, changing and competitive atmosphere of modern organizations and companies demands which 
all institutions and establishments can adapt themselves with the present circumstances and activate in 
accordance with the competitive atmosphere. Nowadays, problem of agency costs has become one of the most 
important concerns of investors.  
Problems of agency costs emanate from this fact that investors usually do not have the desire and or ability 
required to manage the affairs of company, therefore, assign this responsibility to managers. 
If both groups of managers and investors seek to maximize their own interests and if monitoring the performance 
of agent is also required to spend money, it implicitly contains this message which agent may always attempt to 
provide interests of the owner and maximize the wealth. Agency costs arise from issues such as conflict of 
interests between shareholders and management (Amir Aslani, 2005). 
On one hand, nowadays the corporate ownership has a dramatic effect on the method control of and performance 
of companies through ownership of shares. In this way, the owners delegated the corporate management to 
managers and the Stock Exchange markets were formed. One of the means for optimal allocation of resources is 
securities markets. Therefore any problem that arises in the said market is not only the economical problem but 
also turns to the social problem in which the public interests of society will compromise. To resolve mentioned 
problems, one of the important concepts discussed in the past two decades is the concept of corporate 
governance. Two major theoretical viewpoints including both agency and beneficiaries' theories are put forward 
in this case. Each of them differently regard to the issue of the corporate governance. Each of agency and 
beneficiaries' theories respectively regard to problem of broker and employer as well as broker and beneficiaries 
(Hassas Yeganeh, 2005). 
Considering the above subjects in this study, we attempt to investigate the relationship among type of the agency 
costs and corporate governance with liquidity of exchange enterprises. In fact, the main research question is that 
the agency costs and corporate governance in line with improving liquidity status of recognized companies in the 
stock exchange what role can have. 
 
2. The literature of subject 
2.1 The corporate governance 
Corporate governance issue was discussed in the world advanced industrial countries such as the UK, Australia 
and some European countries since the 1990s. The background of this issue dates back to the report in 1992. In 
this report, it had been much emphasis on the existence of institutional shareholders and establishment of the 
internal control system and audit.  
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This report was reviewed on 1995 by Committee of Green berry and finalized in 1998 by the Committee of 
Hample. Majority of world countries, including the UK, China, Korea, Canada, Australia and ... have such a 
code of guidance as codified. Also, disclosing the Watergate elections adventure as well as fraud in capital 
market in America in 2001 caused approval of law called Sarbanes Oxley or the same corporate governance. 
Corporate governance in fact, a set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions is said that affects 
method of a company in terms of management, guidance and or control. Furthermore, corporate governance 
includes relationships among different actors (beneficiaries) and goals which based on them, company is 
administered. The main actors are the operating management, stockholders and board of directors.  
Other beneficiaries include employees, suppliers of goods, customers, banks and other lenders, legislators, the 
environment and generally society. Corporate governance is a multidimensional issue. One of the important 
themes in corporate governance deals with accounting and financial management and supports from the 
implementation of policies and mechanisms fundamentally which ensure the right behavior and support 
stockholders. 
Another major element is the viewpoint of economic efficiency through which corporate governance system 
should improve the economical objectives with careful consideration of shareholders wealth. There also are other 
viewpoints in the field of corporate governance which including it can be noted to beneficiaries' view of that 
demands the greater audit and attention to beneficiaries.  
Corporate governance is a fundamental element in increasing investor trust, promotion of a competitive sense 
and finally improvement of the economic growth. This element is located on top of the international 
development list. James Wolfenson, former president of the World Bank in this regard says: 
"Corporate governance for global economic growth is of more important than sovereignty of nations." To better 
understand the concept of corporate governance, it can be described from two views: The macro (holistic) and 
micro (component-oriented). 
From micro viewpoint, corporate governance involves a set of relationships among management of the company, 
its board of directors, shareholders and other beneficiaries. These relationships which include laws and obvious 
stimuli, form structure through the specified objectives and the means of achieving those objectives and 
monitoring on the implementation. 
Therefore, the basic principles of corporate governance include transparency in corporate structures and 
operations, taking accountability of managers and board members towards shareholders as well as corporate 
responsibility towards employees, lenders, suppliers of goods and local societies that enterprise activates in 
there. 
From the macro view, the appropriate corporate governance, in other words, the amount which enterprises in an 
open and truly space are managed, to gain the confidence of the market, capital efficiency, renew industrial 
structures of countries and finally the public wealth of society is of importance. It is noteworthy that in both the 
micro and macro definitions, the notion of transparency plays a major role.  
In the macro-dimension, transparency in the level of enterprise among the suppliers of capital causes trust. In the 
micro-dimension, transparency causes the general trust in macroeconomic. In both cases, transparency will lead 
to allocating the efficiency of capital. Corporate governance is of very importance for the following reasons: 
- It provides framework for establishing long-term trust among companies and capital external suppliers.  
- By appointing managers who have new experiences and ideas, it gifts strategic thinking to the top of corporate.  
- It makes logical managing and monitoring on the global risk in front of company. 
-By dividing decision-making process, it limits relying on their senior managers and their responsibility (Sinai 
Gods, 2009). 
A few different theoretical frameworks to explain and analyze the corporate governance have been proposed. For 
example, agency theory is arising from financial and economic field. While the transactions cost theory is caused 
by economics and organizational theory as well as the beneficiaries theory is induced by a social viewpoint about 
the issue of the corporate governance (Valipour, 2011). 
Finally purpose of corporate governance includes as follow:  
a) Reducing enterprise risk through improving and promoting transparency and accountability.  
b) Improving of the organization long-term efficiency through preventing authoritarianism and lack taking 
responsibility of the executive management (Lee, 2013). 
2.2 The agency costs  
The agency costs are created by lack of alignment in the interests of companies' owners and managers and thus 
the separation of ownership and control. Model of representation identifies a series of guidance mechanisms that 
align interests of agents and owners and reduce agency costs (Mac King, 2009). 
On the other hand, agency relationship includes a type of contract which based on one or a few individuals of the 
owner, agent or manager are commissioned to the operational implementation. By establishing an agency 
relationship, each of the parties follows maximizing their own personal interests. Because the utility function is 
not identical for managers with owners, therefore arises conflict of interests among them which by the formation 
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of the agency relationship and due to existence of conflict of interests, agency cost occurs (Taghavi et al., 2010). 
In addition, agency costs have a reverse effect on the value of the company, i.e., if the market expects occur such 
costs, value of the company will reduce (Almir and Saboo, 2008). 
Type of agency costs generally is meant as follows:  
a) Direct and indirect costs employing and paying salaries and benefits of manager; 
b) Costs related to the control methods of the manager behavior (cost of auditing, cost creating the system of 
control, etc.);  
c) The remaining costs (difference between actual operations' manager and his operations expected which is 
related to follow personal interests). 
2.3 Background of Research 
Dooskar (2013) offered model for the behavior of stock price liquidity and volatility. In this model, investors 
predict the recent price changes for variations of an asset with risk. When changes in that asset are great, its risk 
expenditure is high and current efficiency of that asset goes down, efficiency rate of risk-free asset also is low 
and market encounters illiquidity. 
Brocht et al (2012) found that the average absolute value of errors in the prediction for future cash flows when 
accruals as a predictor are added to operating cash flows is smaller than when cash flow obtained from 
operations lonely as a predictor is used. 
Liu et al (2011) analyzed the comparative power of operating cash flows and accounting dividend per share in 
describing the company shares assessments. In their all cases studied, earning forecasts per share was a more 
appropriate criterion for the value of the companies. Their study was one of the important and key principles in 
conducting present study so that the comparative power of cash flows versus accounting earning can also be 
discussed in explaining amount of the companies' dividend.  
Chi et al (2009) in a study entitled "The relationship between corporate governance and conservatism" achieved 
to conclusion that in companies which the most shares have been provided institutional investors, requires less 
conservative accounting. 
Lemma (2009) in a study under the title "Exploring the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
corporate governance" came to the conclusion that there is a positive relationship between the amount of the 
independent managers in the board of directors and accounting conservatism in a model from the three models 
studied. 
Harford et al (2008) believe that increasing the quality of corporate governance causes reducing maintenance 
level of companies' capital and liquidity. Results showed that companies with more internal ownership and the 
percentage of institutional ownership have higher maintenance of capital and liquidity maintenance while 
companies with higher quality of corporate governance as well as the more independent and bigger board of 
directors possess less maintenance of capital and liquidity. Furthermore, they continue to investigate this issue 
that how problems of agency costs affect the willingness of American companies for maintenance of cash level 
and to measure problems of agency relationship used from corporate governance multiple criteria. 
Ambi Dymtar and Mart Smith (2006) by investigating two criteria of corporate governance and their relationship 
to the market value of firm realized which in firms with poor governance, each dollar of change in cash causes 
change in market value about 42 to 88 percent will become while this amount is doubled in firms with good 
governance. 
Ahmad Doelman (2005) showed that there is a positive relationship between the shares percent of foreign 
managers and conservatism and there is not a significant relationship between the amount of ownership of 
institutional shareholders and conservatism. 
Joe (2003) found that in field of the company profitability, stronger corporate governance in Korean companies 
is associated with better performance. 
Gampz, Isti and Metric (2003) in America found that the relationship exists between corporate governance and 
companies performance. 
Klasnes et al (2002) also found when the sovereignty of macro shareholders from cash flow rights violates, 
corporate governance becomes poor and value of the company drops. 
Mitoon (2002) found that corporate governance which reduces the asymmetry of information and increases 
monitoring activities has a positive impact on value of the company (Baca et al, 2004). 
Additionally, Lapoorta et al (2002) showed that value of the company in countries which shareholders are 
become better protection as well as the companies which cash flow has more ownership in the hand of observer 
shareholders, is higher. 
Bernard Beck (2001) in a study in Russia found that there is between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. He by using the time series and regression found that a strong relationship exists between size of 
board and the stock market value. 
By the same argument, Lapoorta et al (2000) have reached to this point that external investors have encountered 
this risk that their return on capital does not materialize because the individuals from inside firm (shareholders' 
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controller and managers) may expropriate them. 
Therefore they stated that the corporate governance on a large scale is a set of mechanisms through which 
investors outside the company protect themselves against expropriation of individuals within the company. 
Protection of external investors is the profitable for company. 
Resaeeyan et al (2010) also believe that there is a negative and significant relationship between percentage of 
non-bound board members and cash maintenance level in Tehran Stock Exchange, however, the significant 
relationship doesn’t exist between the percentage of institutional investors and cash maintenance level. Obtained 
results indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship among the percentage of institutional 
investors ownership, the percentage of managers shares ownership, the percentage of the non-bound board 
members, ratio of debt as well as total debt and agency costs. 
Bita Mashayekhi, Mehdi Mohammad Abadi (2010) addressed a research entitled "the relationship of corporate 
governance mechanisms to dividend quality" and the findings of the study didn’t indicate significant relationship 
among the qualities of accruals as one from the components of corporate governance. 
John Yeganeh Hassas, Zohreh Raisi, Seyed Mojtaba Husseini, (2009) examined the relationship between 
corporate governance quality and performance of recognized companies in Tehran Stock Exchange that the 
results of their research indicate that there is no significant relationship between corporate governance and 
performance companies. 
Husseini (2007) has examined the relationship between corporate governance and shareholders efficiency. The 
results indicate that the relationship does not exist between institutional shareholders and shareholder efficiency 
in Iran. 
Qanbari (2007) has investigated the effect of the presence ratio of non-responsible members, transparency of 
information, the internal auditor and institutional shareholders presence as criteria from the corporate governance 
on firm performance. The results have shown that only the presence of institutional shareholders and internal 
audit affects performance of company. 
Nowadays in neoclassical economics, companies and institutions merely are defined supplier firms of goods and 
services which their goal is to maximize profits caused by the activities. But nowadays due to discussing the 
welfare theories in economical topics and providing interests of all beneficiaries in the process of economic 
activities, companies and institutions encounters a wide range from targets beyond the maximizing benefit of the 
firm.  
The agency problems are one from the concerns of corporate governance as well as corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms are from important factors affecting investment maintenance level of capital and 
liquidity's companies.  
Therefore after reviewing the research conducted, it was determined that companies recognized in the Tehran 
Stock Exchange is also not excluded from said challenges especially with rapid qualitative and quantitative 
development which in recent years has occurred in this area and considering that in Iran, significant researches 
about the relationship among the type of agency costs and corporate governance with liquidity of companies has 
not been conducted. 
Therefore this research attempts to examine present status of agency costs and corporate governance as well as 
its relationship with liquidity of the recognized companies in stock exchange and the main objective of this 
research is describing and explaining type of corporate governance and agency costs and providing a criterion 
for evaluating recognized companies in exchange as well as offering a sufficient criterion for analyzing the type 
of agency costs and corporate governance based on the companies' liquidity and financial decision making 
through the potential and de facto shareholders so that recognized companies in Tehran Stock Exchange can 
continue to their survival in this environment filled with turbulent and competitor and prepare themselves 
beforehand for prospective changes. 
In this regard, after studying literature and background of research, its hypotheses were formulated as follows: 
There is a significant relationship between the agency costs and liquidity of Stock Exchange companies. 
There is a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity Stock 
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 Exchange companies. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The method used in this study depending on the purpose is from applied type and in terms of research 
methodology as well as the nature and attitude method addressing problem is descriptive from type of the 
survey. Furthermore, it based on the type of data collected is of quantitative type which in this regard, statements 
recorded from the interviewees, debates and discussions and … and questionnaire has been distributed to receive 
managers and employees comments and the results have been inserted. 
In this regard for implementing the present study, generally the following steps have been pursued. This research 
includes recognized companies (166 companies) in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The statistical population 
studied in this research includes companies recognized in the Tehran Stock Exchange and the systematic 
elimination method has been used to select the sample which criterion applied for the selection of the sample is 
as follows: 
• Companies which during the period desired, their finances year have not changed.  
• These companies aren’t including investment firms and financial institutions. 
• Required financial information includes financial statements and accompanying notes to calculate the 
variables of research in time domain desired is available. 
• Financial year of companies is leading to the 19 March in each year. 
Information of research through collecting data of the different companies by referring to financial reports and 
statements, explanatory notes, weekly and monthly reports of the Stock Exchange, websites, databases, journals 
and reports of exchange has been compiled.  
After collecting many observations and data, they should be properly analyzed and reported by the statistical 
methods. Using from descriptive statistics with the aim of summarizing the information collected and further 
understanding studied population has conducted.  
The purpose of descriptive statistics isn’t justification but is description, extraction and realization of combining 
information with help of numbers language. It should be mentioned that in order to analyze data, it has been used 
from statistical softwares of SPSS and EXCEL. 
 
4. Research findings 
Because variables studied in this research are of spatial type, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is the best option to 
determine normality of the variables. 
Therefore assumptions are as follows: 
The null assumption: variable under consideration is normally distributed. 
The opposite assumption: the variable under consideration isn't normally distributed. 
If the significance level of the test is less from number 0.05, we say that the variable under study is not normal 
and otherwise the variable is normal. As it is observed, all variables are abnormal. 
 
 
Type of agency cost 
Corporate governance 
 
  Liquidity of 
the Stock 
Exchange 
companies 
Transparency of the structures and 
operations 
The company responsibility towards 
employees and … 
Taking responsibility of managers 
Ratio of board of directors' members to 
shares 
Costs of salaries and benefits' manager 
The remaining costs 
Behavior control costs' manager 
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Table 1- Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the variables of study 
Level of significance Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic Scale under consideration Row 
0.008 1.656 Type of agency costs 1 
0.005 1.728 The corporate governance 2 
 
The main findings of the hypothesis 
The first hypothesis: there is the significant relationship between type the of agency costs with liquidity of stock 
exchange companies. 
H0: there is no significant relationship between the type of agency costs and liquidity of stock exchange 
companies. 
H1: there is no significant relationship between the type of agency costs and liquidity of stock exchange 
companies. 
To investigate the relationship between agency costs and the liquidity of stock exchange companies, Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients have been used. Results obtained from this test have been shown in the 
following table. 
Table 2- Correlation coefficients between agency costs and of companies' liquidity 
The 
variable Liquidity of stock exchange companies 
Existence of 
relationship 
Type of 
relationship 
Type of 
agency 
cost 
The Pearson correlation coefficient Spearman correlation coefficient 
has inverse 
The 
correlation 
coefficient 
The level of 
significance Number 
The 
correlation 
coefficient 
The level of 
significance Number 
-0.688** 0.000 166 -0.629** 0.000 166 
**In the level of significance 0.01 
Results obtained from Pearson and Spearman correlation test show which there is a significant relationship 
between the agency costs with liquidity of stock exchange companies (The level of significance less than 0.01) 
and this relationship is placed as reverse in level of relatively strong. 
Table 3- Summary of regression model 
Standard error of estimation Modified R R  R Model 
0.16285 0.470 0.473 0.688 1 
 
According to the above table and the modified-R, we find that the agency costs justify 0.470 (47%) equivalent 
to changes in the liquidity of stock exchange companies.  
The second hypothesis: There is significant relationship between the corporate governance and liquidity of stock 
exchange companies. 
H0: There is not significant relationship between the corporate governance and liquidity of stock exchange 
companies. 
H1: There is significant relationship between the corporate governance and liquidity of stock exchange 
companies. 
To investigate the relationship between variables of the corporate governance and stock exchange companies' 
liquidity, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients have been used. The results obtained from this test have 
been shown in the following table.  
Table 3- Correlation coefficients between the variables of the corporate governance and stock exchange 
companies' liquidity 
The 
variable Liquidity of stock exchange companies 
Existence of 
relationship 
Type of 
relationship 
The 
corporate 
governance 
The Pearson correlation coefficient Spearman correlation coefficient 
has direct 
The 
correlation 
coefficient 
The level of 
significance Number 
The 
correlation 
coefficient 
The level of 
significance Number 
0.364** 0.000 166 0.296** 0.000 166 
**In the level of significance 0.01 
Results obtained from Pearson and Spearman correlation test show that there is the significant relationship 
between corporate governance and stock exchange companies' liquidity (level of significance less than 0.01) and 
this relationship is placed directly and in a relatively weak level. 
Table 4 - Summary of regression model 
Standard error of estimation Modified R R  R Model 
0.20903 0.127 0.132 0.364 1 
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According to the above table and the modified R amount, we find that the corporate governance justifies 0.127 
(12.7%) equivalent of the changes in companies' liquidity. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Corporate governance is reoffered to collection of processes, customs, policies and laws which affect method of 
company administration. The importance of corporate governance in plain language is in it that governs the 
collective wisdom in the critical affairs. The main actors in the corporate governance are operating management, 
shareholders and board of directors. 
Usually the word of governance is referred to monitoring the activities' board of directors on the goals, programs 
and general policies of the organization that includes the state of plans and policies, monitoring on the 
performance of senior executives, providing adequate resources for the organization, ensuring from the 
implementation of laws and regulations, agent on behalf of the organization against beneficiaries outside the 
organization and …. The board of directors is said to group from individuals who are legally responsible for the 
governance of organization. 
In this research, relationship among the type of agency costs and the corporate governance with liquidity was 
studied. According to the literature of subject, as expected, relationship between the agency costs and the 
corporate governance with liquidity was proven and due to tests conducted, the significant relationship was 
observed among them. 
The results of tests carried out indicate that agency costs and corporate governance respectively as reverse and 
direct are associated with liquidity of companies. In the third millennium, companies are being forced to survive 
and progress in the current competitive world, focus the major part of their own efforts on the processes and 
functions which play a fundamental role in the success and improvement of their performance. 
Including the effective processes in improving performance is using from financing and liquidity means which in 
case of benefit from the effectiveness criteria, it can have a significant role in firm performance. According to 
the results obtained is specified which from the most important corporate governance mechanisms, the presence 
of institutional shareholders can be noted as an external mechanism. This criterion not only directly affects the 
performance and the liquidity of companies but also indirectly and through effect on utilizing other corporate 
governance mechanisms can improve the companies' liquidity status. 
To achieve above objectives and improve corporate performance, fields of establishing the appropriate liquidity 
in companies by encouraging and even forcing the use of corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs 
should be provided by the Tehran Stock Exchange. Considering the results obtained therefore, it is suggest that: 
1- Regarding the research evidences and results which indicate a relationship among the type of agency 
costs and corporate governance with liquidity in recognized companies in Tehran Stock Exchange, 
shareholders and investors are recommended which include factors obtained from this investigation in 
their own decision making. Financial investors and analysts always should consider category of 
liquidity and include analyses related to the difference between profit and operating cash flow in their 
own decision making model. 
2- Users from financial reports should know which agency costs and corporate governance in a company 
do not provide sufficient assurance from the effective supervision on the cash maintenance level 
companies. 
3- It is suggested that more disclosure about information related to the structure of the companies' board of 
directors is conducted because by increasing the percentage of non-responsible the board of directors' 
members, monitoring the efficiency is carried out on the level of liquidity and cash maintenance level 
decreases by firms. 
4- The Stock Exchange organization is recommended that has more supervision toward providing 
desirable and transparent information of exchange companies and more considers factors influencing 
liquidity of companies. 
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